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declined to extend the principle in Mansfield v. Lynch (supra),
to the extent of holding the defendant, an accommodation endorser of a note which proved non-negotiable, legally liable
upon an implied promise to pay. "To hold" it was said in the
opinion, "because the parties were mutually mistaken in the
legal effect of the real transaction, justice would be subserved
by the imputation in its place 'of a fictitious one, would be
going further than we are aware that any court has yet gone
and beyond what it seems to us proper and right or safe
to do."
The subject, it will be seen, is full of difficulty to one who
-would attempt to state general principles applicable in"all
jurisdictions, but it is not difficult to ascertain the law in any
given forum. The peculiarity is that, in almost every instance
where the law has been laid down, it has been done in such
vigorous and decided language that its meaning cannot be
mistaken; there is no middle ground. Where, however, a
recovery is allowed assumpsit would appear to be the proper
form of action and is, indeed, the one usually adopted.
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FAUNTLEROY, J.-" The Commissioners reported as a matter
of opinion that the widow of W. S. Kerfoot was entitled to
dower in an undivided half interest of a storehouse and lot in
1
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Berryville which wa s partnership property of Hardesty &
Kerfo6t, of which firm W. S. Kerfoot has been a member.
To this report the creditors, who for the first time were before
the court in the case, filed sundry exceptions. They denied
that the widow was dowable in the property consisting in the
storehouse and lot." The lower court dcided that the said
property was subject to the dower of Kerfoot's widow after
the social debts were provided for. "In this the court erred.
The 'record establishes beyond a doubt that the storehouse
and lot in Berryville were part of the social assets of.Hardesty
& Kerfoot, and, being such, they were, in the'eye of the law,
personalty in which the widow could participate 'only as a
distributee."
THE DEVOLUTION OF FIRM REAL ESTATE.

The principles of the common law, which were established
for the government of a nation in which the chief index of
wealth should. be the ownership of land, and inheritance the
only means of its transmission, were to a great extent unsuited
to the relation of partnership, which had its origin in the early
Roman law, and its growth and perfection in the maritime
cities of Europe, where the claims of the heir were less prominent, and the calling .of the mercharit was not stamped with
dishonor. Therefore, no small difficulty was experienced by
the early English judges in adjusting the claims of the various
interested parties, either among the principals themselves, or
their creditors or third parties; and this at a time when the
business of-partnership was confined strictly to commerce and
dealt only with articles of ordinary trade,.which were, almost
without exception, personal in their nature. But when, in
later times, land came to be included among the firm assets,
the difficulty was 'increased, for the principals of the feudal
system had more fully fixed themselves on the law of real
estate. The common law could recognize only such title to
real estate as it already knew, and there was no known tenure
which would satisfactorily answer the exigencies of the relation and properly protect the rights of the individua partners,
and at the same time recognize the paramount claims of the
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partnership creditors. Joint tenancy and tenancy in common
were both tried and found wanting, as, in the former, on
account of the doctrine of survivorship, the representatives of
the deceased partner would be disappointed of their ancestor's
share, which would go to the survivor under the wellknown principles of the common law; while in the latter
the individual creditors would have preference over those
of the firm, and so a most important canon of partnership
be defeated. In this embarrassment the assistance of the Court
of Chancery was called in, which cut the knot by considering
the real estate as converted into personalty as soon as it is.
brought into the partnership and made a firm asset. In thi
way the rights of all parties were satisfactorily protected, the
firm creditors being first entitled to the proceeds of a sale of
the land, and the remainder being distributed among the partners according to their interest.
This theory has, as a whole, remained unchanged up to the
present time, although some of its corrolaries have occasioned
much difference-of opinion, and although it has been earnestly
contended that, upon a sound understanding of principles of
partnership, the same result could have been attained without
the introduction of legal fictions: James Parsons on Part.,

§

109.

The question which arose in the principal case, and a question which must immediately arise under the conversion theory,
is the extent to which it is to be carried. If land belonging to
a partnership is, so far as the principals are-concerned, to be
considered as personal property, how long is it to retain that
character? And is the interest of a deceased, partner in firm
real estate to go to his heir or to his personal representative?
Upon this last question there has been much diversity of
opinion, and the doctrine held by the English and American
courts is, with a few exceptional States, diametrically opposed.
One of the earliest cases to rule the point was Thornton v.
Dixon, 3 Cro. Ch. C. -99, decided by Lord Chancellor Thurlow in 1791. It arose out of the construction of a partnership
agreement, and the Lord Chancellor, after determining that
the agreement was not sufficiently clear to alter the course of
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the law, awarded the fund in hand for distribution, in so far as
it was derived from the personal assets of the late firm, to the
personal representative of the deceased partner, and, so far as
it was derived from the real assets, to the heir-at-law. -This
would seem to recognize a conversion sub modo only, and so
to oppose the modern English doctrine: The decision was
followed in 1802 by Sir William Grant, in Bell v. Phyn,
7 Vesey, 453, and in Belman v. Shore, 9 Vesey, 5Ol, and by
Sir Lancelot Shadwell in Cookson v. Cookson, 8 Sim. 529, SO
late as 1837. Notwithstanding the decision of Lord Thurlow,
Lord Eldon, a few years later, laid down a different rule in
Townsend v. Devuynes, I Montague Part., App. 97, and followed it, in 1814, by his judgment in Selkrigg v. Davis, 2 Dow.
P. C. 23 I, where he is quoted as saying: "My own individual
opinion is, that all the property involved in a partnership concern ought -to be considered as personalty." The modern
English decisions have followed this rule, so that Mr. Lindley
(Partnership, 343, etc.) adopts the language of Vice-Chancellor
Kindersly in Darby v..Darby (post), to the effect that "wherever a partnership purchases real estate for the partnership
purposes, and with partnership funds, it is, as between the real
and personal representatives of the partners, personal estate:
Phillips v. Phillips, I My. and K. 649 (1833); Fereday v.
Wightwick, I R. and M. 435; Broom v. Broom, 3 M. and K.
443; Morris v. Kearsley, 2 Y. and C. Ex. 139; Houghton v.
Houghton, I I Sim. 491 ; Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew, 495.
Sir Lancelot Shadwell, in 1845, refused to consider the conversion so complete as to subject the fund arising from a sale
of firm real estate to the payment of probate duty: Custance
v. Bradshaw, 4 Hare, 315; but even this- point has been set
at rest in the affirmative by the case of the Attorney-General
v. Hubbock, L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 287, where it was decided by
Lord Chief Justice Colridge and Lords Bowen ahd Brett that
the real estate of a firm was converted out and out into personalty, and that the probate duty would attach: Atty-Gen.
v. Marq. of Ailesbury, L. R. 12 App. Cases, 672.
Although, as remarked a few lines back,. Cookson v. Cookson (8 Sim. 529) adhered to the rule of Thornton v. Dixon,
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-the immediate decision was put upon the ground that the
land had not been purchased with partnership funds, but had
descended to the partners from their father; and also that,
since no rights of creditors w&re involved, there was no occasion for the conversion. This distinction was pressed in
several cases, and would seem to have been suggested by
Thornton v. Dixbn itself, It was not recognized, however, by
Lord Justice James in Waterer v. Waterer, L. R. 15 Eq. 402
(1872), where he put the question finally to rest with the
remark: "It seems to me immaterial how it (i. e., the land)
may have been acquired, whether by descent or by devise, if,
in fact, it was subsequently involved in the business." And
the same thought is well expressed by Lindley (Part. 343, etc.):
Notwithstanding Cookson v. Cookson, no satisfactory distinction with reference to the question of conversion can be
drawn between land purchased with partnership moneys and
land acquired in any other way, provided such land is, in the
proper sense of the expression, an asset of the partnership.
And this mar be considered as the American rule, also:
Collumb v. Reed, 24 N. Y. 505 (1862).
From these statements of the law the further proposition
is easily deduced that, whether or not particular propertyis an asset of the partnership is a question, notwithstanding
the name in which it is held, which may, as a general rule,
be proved by parole evidence, notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds. This, however, is subject to the right of innocent
third persons, without notice, who have depended on the
record title or some similar circumstances: Am. and Eng.
Ency. of'Law, Vol. 17, p. 945; Whaling Co. v. Borden,
Io Cush, 458; Shafer's App. io6 Pa. St. 49 (1884). But
see Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471 (1876); Bird v.
Morrison, 12.WiS. 138 (I86O).

Before noticing the American rule upon this subject, it may
be well to look slightly at the reasoning which, in England,
has given the land to the personal representatives, and in
America has preserved the rights of the heir-at-law. The
early English cases have given no definite reasons for the introduction of the conversion theory further than that stated in
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the early part of this note. Mr. Parsons (Partnership, 369)
suggests two rather historical grounds, to the general effect
that, since partnership is an agent of trade, where a man puts
land into. the firm it must be treated as if he had actually
sold it and contributed the proceeds. He also suggests the
inequality in distribution in case -of deatl, were any other
scheme to prevail. The reason, as stated in many of the
American cases is, that, having put land into the trade, it
must be considered that a conversion was intended by the
parties themselves, and that intention will, of course; prevail..
Of all these reasons, the supposed intention of the parties is
the basis. A very ingenious explanation of the rule was that
advanced by Vice-Chancellor Kindersly in Darby v. Darby
3 Drew, 495 (1856).
His argument, somewhat abridged,
follows: "The clear principle of this court as to partnership is,.
that on dissolution all the property of the -partnership shall
be sold, and after discharging all the partnership debts and
liabilities, shall be divided among the partners according to
their respective shares in. the capital. This is the general rule;
it is inherent in every contract of partnership. That the rule
applies to all ordinary property is beyond all question, and no
'one partner has a right to insist that any particular part or
item of the partnership. property shall 'emain unsold, and that
he shall retain his own share of it in specie." This principle
is clearly laid down by Lord Eldon and Sir William Grant,
and the right of a partner to insist on a sale of all the partnership property is just as stringent as a special contract would
be. " If, then, this rule applies to ordinary stock in trade,
why not to all kinds of partnership property ?" He then
shows that the same rule does apply to-a lease for years
where the rent is paid with firm moneys, and argues that the
same rule must apply to a fee simple necessary for and paid
for by the firm. Continuing, he says: "It may, tlerefore, be
conceded that on dissolution all kinds of property may be
compelled to be sold by the partners, or each representative of'
a deceased partner. Now, what is the doctrine of this court
as to conversion ? If a testator seized of real estate, devise
it for sale, and direct that all the proceeds of such sale shall be
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divided among certain persons so that each of the cestui que
trusts is entitled to say he will have it sold and will take his
share of the proceeds, that real estate is, in equity, converted
into personalty; and so, if three persons contract that real
estate belonging to them shall be sold and the proceeds be
divided among them, so that each of them has the right to
insist that it shall be sold, and that he shall have his share of
the proceeds as money, that real estate is, in equity, converted into personalty, and if one of them dies while the
property remains unsold, his share is personalty as between
his heirs and personal representatives. Now, if it be established that by the contract of partnership all the partnership
property is to be sold at the dissolution of the partnership,
then any real estate which has become the property of the
partnership becomes, by force of the partnership contract,
personalty, and that not merely as between the partners to
the extent of discharging partnership debts, but as between
the real and personal representatives of the deceased partner."
Although this statement of the law is from a high authority,
and from the closeness and clearness of the reasoning would
seem to carry considerable conviction, it does not seem to
have been considered in any of the later decisions, and none
of the American authorities which have so fiercely combatted
the ultitiate English rule have in any way attacked the reasoning of the Vice-Chancellor. Perhaps the same thought may
be found in Sumner v. Hampson, 8 Ohio, 328 (1838), and in
Green v. Green, I Ohio, 535 (I824), and possibly a few other
cases; but in none is the doctrine so fully considered as in
Darby v. Darby. It is open to the objection, which is especially weighty to an American, that it is entirely a deduction of
legal and technical logic, the result of which is the establishment of a rule incomprehensible to the lay mind and contrary
to ordinary common sense.
A number of the earlier American decisions adhered to the
English rule, and a few of the States even yet hold to it in a
more or less modified form. As early as 1824, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held, in Green v. Green, I Ohio, 535,that a man
had no such estate of inheritance in land held by a partnership
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of which he was a member as to entitle his wife to dowerinitupon his death, and the same rule still subsists in that State,
with a modification to be mentioned later: Rammelsburg et al.
v. Mitchell et al, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875); Green v. Graham,
5 Ham. (0.) 244 (1831).
Virginia, from whence came the principal case, adopted the
same. rule in 1839, and has adhered to it ever since. The
reasoning of Pierce v. Trigg, Io Leigh. 423, in which the rule
was first laid down, is worth considering, especially in the case
where land is purchased by the firm, with firm moneys; but
it has no application to the case of land contributed by onepartner, or, in fact, to land acquired in any other way. The
court said: "Since upon familiar principles the land was purchased with personalty, it ought, as between the executor and
heir, to replace the fund withdrawn from the personal estate :"
Wheatly Heirs v. Calhoun, 12 Leigh. 264 (1841); Parrish v.
Parrish, 88 Va. 529 (1892); Deering v. Kerfoot (principal
case).
By the decision of Galbraith v. Gedge, 16 B. Mon. 641
(1855), Kentucky laid the foundation for the same rule,.
although the land actually in question was awarded to the
heir, but upon the ground that it did not appear that it was
actually partnershili property. But in Cornwall v. Cornwall,
6 Bush. (Ky.) 369 (1869), the land had been purchased with
partnership funds, and clearly for partnership purposes, and
although it was not necessary that it should have been sold
for the payment of debts, the wife was awarded one-third of'
the precee.ds" as personalty, the court saying.; "Where real
estate is purchased with partnership funds for the purpose of
carrying on and facilitating the partnership business and purposes, and it is used as a means of continuing and enlarging
the partnership business, operations and profits, it then is part-.
nership property, impressed with the character of. personalty
for any aid all purposes, not only as between the partners
inter se, and the firm and its creditors, but also as to distribution between the administrators and heirs:" Bank of Louisville v. Hall & Long, 8 Bush. (Ky.) 672 (187).
In the case of Hoxie v. Carr, I Sum. 173 (1832), Mr. Jus-.
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tice Story expressed a decided opinion in favor of the English
rule, although the case before him did not actually raise the
point; and Mr. Chancellor Kent (Com. III, 39), after noticing.
some of the American cases, says: "But the other American
decisions are more restricted in their operation, and are not
inconsistent with the more correct and improved view of the
English law."
These instances mark the extent of the absolute conversion
theory, in so far as it has been adopted in the American
courts; but, as hinted a few lines back, even these are not as.
extreme in their scope as the rule laid down by Lord Eldon.
The basis of the whole theory of conversion is the supposed
intention of the parties: Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. 159; Buckley v. Buckley, I I Barb. S. C. 43 (1850); Galbraith v. Gedge,
16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 631 (1855).
The parties may specially agree among themselves that the
land shall be considered either real or personal property, and
that agreement will control its character. This was clearlythe opinion of Lord Thurlow in Thornton v. Dixon (supra),
when he said the agreement under consideration "was not
sufficient to vary the nature of the property." And Mr.
Justice Story follows the same opinion: Story on Part., § 93
and n. See cases: Bell v. Phyn, 7 Vesey, 453; Lindley on
Part. 343; Goodburn v. Stevens et. al., 5 Gill (Md.), I (1847);
Green v. Green, I Ohio, 535 (1824); Smith v. Jackson,.
2 Edwd.. Ch. 28 (1833); Lenow v. Jones, 48 Ark. 557 (1886).
Upon this theory, then, the question has arisen, what is a suffi-cient declaration of intention to change the nature of the
property? This would seem to be the real point of diver-.
gence between the cases which hold to a conversion out and
out, and those which hold to a conversion sub modo only..
Thus it was said in Coles v. Coles (supra): "There may be
special covenants and agreements relative to the use and
enjoyment of the real estate, and in the absence of such special
covenant the real estate owned by the partnership must be
considered and treated as such, without any reference to the
partnership." And in Buckley v. Buckley (supra), Judge Hand
said that in the absence of any express intention, the presump-
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tion is there should be no change in character. As a general
rule the simple use and occupation of the land by the partnership is not sufficient to establish such an intention and consequent conversion, as may be seen by nearly all the cases in
which the question has been considered. Yet in most of the
United States where the absolute conversion theory holds, this
fact has been considered as a sufficient declaration of the
intention of the parties. Thus it was said in Galbraith v.
Gedge (ante): "If real estate purchased by partners with partnership means, for partnership purposes-that, is be so
purchased, to be used, dealt with, and disposed of as personalty,
it should for commercial convenience partake of the character
which the partners have thus impressed upon it, ahd upon the
dissolution of the firm by the death of one of the partners,
his share ought to belong as personalty to the executor or
administrator, and not descend to the heir, and should in all
respects be treated as personal estate."
But the land must be necessary for'and actually used in the
partnership or it will be converted only sub modo. This theory
was well discussed in the case of Runmelsburg et- al. v.
Mitchell et al., 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875), where the question of
conversion was squarely before the court, Judge Mcllvane
says: "But wht is a sufficient agreement? It need not be
in writing-the intention may be shown from circumstances,"
merely bringing real estate into the partnership is not sufficient,
but where "real estate is purchased for partnership purposes,
paid for with partnership money, and used simply for the
partnership business" such conversion is sufficiently shown.
The line of demarcation between an absolute conversion, and a
conversion sub modo is this, in the former' if must" be needed
and actually used in the partnership business, in the latter it is
sufficient that it was purchased with partnership funds : Pierce
v. Trigg, io Leigh. 423; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 12 Leigh. 264.
It is generally admitted, however, that any agreement or
provision which evinces a clear design that the land shall be
considered and distributed as money will stamp its character,
although such understanding does not appear in terms. Thus,
such a provision in the will of a deceased partner will be suffi-

THE DEVOLUTION OF FIRM REAL ESTATE.

cient: Woodbridge v. Watkins et al., 3 How. (Miss.) 360
(1839); Davis v. Clark, 82 Ala. 198 (1886); Coster v. Clark,
3 Edwd. Ch. 452.
Having noticed the English rule and its modifications in the
United States we will proceed with a discussion of what may be
termed the general American doctrine. It is thus stated in the
American and Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. I7,P. 953. Firm real
estate" is to be regarded in equity as personal property so far
only as may be necessary for the payment of debts and the
adjustment of partnership accounts, the balance retaining all
the incidents of real property." A great number of authorities may be cited for this, among which may be noted the
following: Story on Partnership, § 93 and n.; Lindley
on Partnership, 343, etc. ; Scribner on Dower, II, 103;
Shanks v. Kline, 14 Otto, I8 (1881); Platt v. Oliver,
3 McLean (U. S.), 27 (1842); Logan v. Greenlaw, 25 Fed. Rep.
299 (1885); Clay v. Field, 34 Fed. Rep. 375 (1888); Burnside v. Merrick, 4 Met. (Mass.) 537; Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met.
(Mass.) 569 (1843); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 95 Mass. 255 (1866);
Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107 (1867); Keith v. Keith, 143
Mass. 262 (1887); Foster's App. 74 Pa. St. 391 (1873);
Dubree v. Albert, IOO Pa. St. 483 (1882); Leif's App., 105 Pa.
St. 505 (1884); Smith v. Jackson, 2 Edwd. Ch. 28 (1833);
Coster v. Clark, 3 Edwd. Ch. 452 (1840); Buchan v. Sumner,
2 Barb. Ch. 548 (1847); Buckley v. Buckley, i I Barb. S. C.
43 (850); Collumb v. Reed, 24 N. Y. 505 (1862); Fairchild
v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471 (1876); Bopp v. Fox, 63 Ill. 540
(1872); Simpson v. Leich, 86 Ill. 286 (877); Strong et at..
v. Lord et al., 107 III. 25 (883); Duhring v. Duhring,
20 Mo. 174; Holmes v. McGill, 27 Mo. 597 (1859); Grissom
v. Moore, io6 Mo. 296 (1885); Young v. Thrasher, 21 S.IV.(Mo.) IIO4; Yetman v. Woods, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 20 (1834);
Piper v. Smith, i Head (Tenn.), 937 (1858); Griffy v. Northcutt et al., 5 Heisk (Tenn.), 747 (187); Jones D. Sharp,
9 Heisk (Tenn.), 66o (I872); Markham v. Merritt et at.,
7 How. (Miss.), 437 (1843); Sykes v. Sykes, 49 Miss. 190
(1870); Robinshaw v. Hanway, 52 Miss. 713 (1876);
Wheeler v Sempler, 5 C. E. Grier (N. J.), 228 ; Campbell v,.
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Campbell, 3o N. J. Eq. 415 (1879); Buffman v. Buffman,
49 Me. io8 (1861); Goodburn v. Stevens, 5 Gill (Md.),
I (1847); Bird v. Morrison, 12 Wis. 138 (i86o); Martin,
etc. v. Martin, 62 Wis. 418 (1885); Smith v. Davis, 82 Ala.
198 (1886); Lenow v. Jones, 48 Ark. 557 (1886); Bowman
v. Baily, 20 S. C. 550 (1883); Clay v. Stebbins, 47 Mich. 296
(1882); Hewett v. Rankin, 41 Ia. 35 (1878); Tellinghast v.
Chapman et al., 4 R. I. 173 (i856).
A general summing up of these authorities would seem to
amount to this, that upon the bringing of real estate into a firm
as an asset, it is, in equity, converted into personalty to all
intents, so far as the partnership or its affairs are concerned,
but that upon the settlement of the affairs of the 'partnership,
that which is ascertained to be remaining in specie, or the
balance of what has been sold for the partnership business and
mot used, wCvill retain its natural character, and descend, in case
of the death of a partner, in all respects as land. During the
continuance of the relation, so far as the individual partners are
.concerned, the land is absolutely converted, and a judgment
.against one will not bind his share in it: Meily v. Wood, 71
Pa. St. 488 (1872); Leif's App. 105 Pa. St. 505 (1884).
And it has even been held .that equitable ejectment will not
be for a partner's interest in firm real estate, because there is no
such legal title as will support it: Du Bree v. Albert, ioo Pa.
St. 483 (1882).
However reasonable these expressions of the law may appear
on their face, there is a manifest inconsistency when we remember that in all this line of cases the right of the widow to her
dower is never doubted, and that right can only attach to land
of which the husband has a legal seizen in his lifetime: James
Parsons on Part., § io9.
But the question can now hardly be considered an open one.
The right of the widow to her dower, and of the heir to his
inheritance depend upon the same theory, and what will
support the one, must support the other: Dyer v. Clark,
5 Met. (Mass.) 569; Goodburn et ux. v. Stevens et al., 5 Gill
(Md.),

1.

While the reasons given for the English rule are few and in
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the main unsatisfactory, those which have been advanced in
America as the basis of the right of the heir are somewhat
diverse, and while the result is in the end the same, that end is
reached sometimes by different paths. It has been held in a
number of cases that, immediately upon the death of a partner,
the land descends to the heir and surviving partner as tenants
in common, subject to an implied trust for the benefit of the
creditors of the partnership, and that the survivor may make a
valid conveyance of the land for their benefit. It will not,
however, be a complete conveyance, since the heirs, who have
an equal right, have not joined in the deed, but the court will
compel them to do so in a proper case: Delmonico v.
Guelaume et al., 2 Sanf Ch. 366 (1845); Griffy et ux. v. Northcutt, 5 Heisk (Tenn.), 747 (1871); Jones v. Sharp, 9 Heisk
(Tenn.), 66o (872); Shanks v. Kline, 104 U. S. (i4 Otto.) i8
(188J).
Nearly the same view was takeri in the case of Martin, etc.,
v. Martin, 62 Wis. 418 (1885), where'the court said: "While
there were debts, Hall, held as surviving partner and trustee
for the creditors of the firm, but on winding up he was trustee
of the balance for the benefit of the heir of the deceased
partner, as against the personal representatives."
Judge Hammond in Logan v. Greenlaw, 25 Fed. Rep. 299
(1885), advanced quite a new and original opinion when he
said: "In my view of it the land descends only sub mrodo and
they (that is, the heirs), do not hold so much as heirs at law,
but rather as statutory assignees, or distributees of the surplus
proceeds of partnership real estate."
These expressions of opinion show clearly, by their variety
and difference, the lack of positive and certain foundation for
the conversion fiction as a whole, and, demonstrate the misfortune which Mr. Parsons has pointed out (Partnership, § io9),
that it was ever thought necessary to introduce it.
The course of reasoning by which the American rule has
been established is well shown by the able opinion of Justice
Sharswood in Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 391 (1873).

abridgement of it follows:

"Conversion

is altogether

An

a

doctrine of equity . . . it is admitted only for the accomplish-
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ment of equitable results. It may be termed an equitable
fiction, and the legal maxim in fictione juris semper snbsistit
equitas has redoubled force in application to it. It follows of
necessity that it is limited to its end. There must be some
purpose recognized as lawful to be accomplished before equity
will allow it to have place." " Land of a partnership when
sold by the firm becomes land again in the hands of the
purchaser, and the proceeds personalty; but personalty to
what extent? Only to- the extent of accomplishing the conversion, namely, the equity of the partners to have the joint
debts and their own advancements paid, before any part goes
to the other partners or their seperate creditors."
He
concludes this branch of the opinion as follows: "If the land
remaining in specie after the partnership is dissolved and
wound-up, and all the purposes of conversion answered is
still personal property, how long is it to remain so? Certainly,
all the forms of law as to ieal estate must be observed from
hand to hand, and shall it not be subject to the lien of judgments in the lifetime, and debts upon the death of the owner?
If not, uncertainty and litigation will indelibly mark its
character. But it may be asked, when is the exact moment
of its re-conversion ? - The answer is, the moment the partnership is wound up either by decree, judgment, or agreement,
and it is determined that it no longer forms part of the partnership stock, and is not required for its purposes." This is
certainly a strong. case, not only on account of its high
authority and able reasoning, but because of the practical
common sense of the rule evolved. It has frequently been
cited as an authority in other jurisdictions, and when
considered with the opinion of Justice Shaw, 'of Massachusetts;
in Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. 569 (1843), and Justice Wells in
Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107 (1867), the whole learning
on this branch of the law is pretty well covered.-. The following language from the last case should be quoted as a supplement to that from Foster's Appeal. "It would seem,
therefore, that conversion should be made only whedi, and so
far as is. required for that purpose (i. e., adjusting the affairs of
the partnership) and that the effect on the descenf or distribu-
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fion of the share of a deceased partner among his representatives should be regarded as an incident merely, and not an end
for whicl the interference of a court of equity is to be sought."
Upon this subject there is but a single further point to be
noted. It was raised in Pennsylvania in the case of Leaf's
Appeal, io5 Pa. St. 505 (1884). The partnership agreement
provided that all real estate should be personal property and
that the firm should not be dissolved by the death of a partner,
but only by the consent of all. The firm acquired a large
amount of real estate with its profits. One partner died
leaving children, and a wife who subseqently married again
and died. The widow, by will, gave all her interest in the
firm, of which her deceased husband was a member, to her
second husband, who claimed the dividends of the firm as the
proceeds of personal property, as against the heir at law, who
claimed that, for purposes of descent, the partnership land was
to be considered as unconverted. The court considered the
contract not to dissolve on the death of a partner valid
(Loughlin v. Lorenzo, 48 Pa. St. 282; Burwell v. Manderson,
2 How. 576; Jones v. Walker, 13 Otto. 446), and held that
since the firm was still existing its real estate was to be considered and to descend as personalty, and that the second
husband was entitled to receive the dividend on one-third of
the one-fifth interest held by the deceased member. This is
not inconsistent with the general rule, and alone is not surprising. But the language of the court which follows is not
so satisfactory and would seem, to some, open to grave
question, at least on account of its practical effect. Justice Green, after confirming the doctrine of Foster's Appeal,
in a case where the affairs of the firm were wound up, and
distinguishing the circumstances of the case before him, concludes his opinion with the following language (pp. 513, "514):
"It cannot now be known that the real estate will not be
required for the payment of debts. The firm still continues its
business under a lawful agreement to that effect. Whenever
a dissolution shall be established, and a final settlement of
accounts shall take place, the positions contended for and the
reasons by which they are enforced will become entirely appli-
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cable and will exercise a very potent and possibly controlling
influence upon the question which will then arise between the
present litigants. or who may succeed them."
The action was simply for the income, and the -principal
fund was not contended for, but it is difficnlt to see how one
set of claimants can be entitled to that'income, during -the
continuance of the partnership, and immediately on its dissolution, another set become entitled-not by reason of any act by
any individual, but simply by the act of the law-operating
through the fact of dissolution.
Ordinarily, the rights of the claimants in' the estate of a
deceased person are fixed at his death, and once vested cannot
be divested, save by special provisions or circumstances; but
the rule here laid down, unless made necessary by peculiar
circumstances not appearing in the report, may unsettle this
rule and give rise to considerable uncertainty in the future.
Truly the language is dictum only, but it is worth considering.
Upon the subject of firm land generally, and its disposition
after the death of a partner the student will find additonal
information in the American and Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 17,
p. 952, &c., where many authorities are cited. In an article
on Firm Real Estate in the'Albany Law Journal, Vol. 32,
pp. 284, 304, 326, and the able note of Judge Arnold to Foster's App., 13 Am. Law. Reg., N. S. 300, beside the generally
full treatment.of the matter in most of the leading text books.
C. WILFRED CONARD.

Phila., Pa., May 9, 1894.

